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The Canadian Response to the Overseas Reach
of United States Antitrust Law: Stage I and
Stage II Amendments to the Combines
Investigation Act
by Roy M. Davidson*

E ARLIER

THIS MORNING Mr. Donald Baker introduced his remarks
with a comment on conflict among friends. I should say that I have experienced a certain conflict too. For the past thirty years I have been tangling
with the legal community in Canada in the combines field because my
background is economics and not law. There is a constant conflict in our
operation between the economic perspective and the legal one. Consequently,
since my remarks are going to be directed primarily from an economic
perspective, I am probably running the risk of making many of the lawyers
here today unhappy.
The title of my contribution this morning is not quite as I would have
phrased it myself. In my Department we have never considered ourselves or
our legislation to be in any adversary relationship with our friends in the
United States antitrust agencies, nor with the laws they administer. Looked at
as a whole, the effects of the United States antitrust laws upon Canada we
think, have been benign. I wonder sometimes if people should not ask
themselves what it would be like for Canada to have to trade with a cartelized
America.
It has to be recognized that in various sectors of industry, all countries
are faced by oligopolies operating on a world scale. Where such an international industry structure is dictated by economic imperatives, it is idle to
complain. What this means however is that, unlike oligopolies operating only
in national markets, in the case of international oligopolies no monitoring
agency exists to exercise any control over them. In these circumstances, and
despite some serious difficulties they have caused, we think the constraints imposed by the United States antitrust laws upon American multinationals
abroad have been generally consistent with Canadian laws and interests.
These statements are not just based on random observation. Some years
ago we attempted to assess the situation in a systematic way, though the facts
are difficult to come by. At that time we examined every United States antitrust case we could find which appeared to have had some identifiable impact in Canada. It turned out that in most such cases, Canadian export opportunities increased, or import prices dropped, or barriers to the entry of
new competition in Canada declined.
*,Senior Deputy Director, Investigation & Research, Combines Bureau of Competition
Policy, Dep't of Consumer & Corporate Affairs, Ottawa. This paper was delivered at the
Canada-United States Law Institute's Antitrust Conference, held September 30, 1977, at-the
University of Western Ontario, London.
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As I shall explain in a few moments, the international aspects of the
Stage I and Stage II amendments are directed primarily at attempting to
control certain international restrictive business practices affecting Canada
adversely. Nevertheless, as I have said, there have been some difficulties stemming from the overseas reach of United States laws, and some of the concern
about that is reflected in the Stage I amendments. Let us begin by looking at
the earlier record of some of these difficulties and Canadian responses to
them.
In 1947, a grand jury in the United States subpoenaed International
Paper Company, a New York corporation, to produce documents under the
control of two affiliates in the Province of Quebec, one of which was
Canadian International Paper (CIP). The United States court found that CIP
was doing business within United States jurisdiction, itself or by an agent,
and was therefore subject to the court's order for the production of
documents within its control, even though they were located in Canada. It
was compulsion of this kind by the United States courts which led to the
enactment of legislation in Quebec and Ontario concerning the removal of
business records. Both statutes prohibit removal of corporate records in compliance with any requirement, order, direction, or subpoena of a legislative,
administrative or judicial authority in a jurisdiction outside the province. I
understand, however, that these laws are not quite as strong in practice as
they may sound. For example, they do not prevent a foreign parent from obtaining records from a Canadian subsidiary. Recently, they were not considered adequate to prevent transfer of certain uranium documents abroad.
The Imperial Chemical Industries case2 of 1951 is an interesting example
of how the United States antitrust laws can have an effect in Canada even
without the assertion of jurisdiction in Canada. DuPont, an American company, and Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), a British company, were
ordered to divest themselves of holdings in any companies which they owned
jointly. This included Canadian Industries Limited (CIL), then our largest
chemical company by far. The assets of this company were divided, and
DuPont sold its shares in CIL to ICI and set up a separate chemical firm in
Canada.
A case which was to have broader repercussions for our international
relations was the CanadianRadio Patents Limited case.3 In 1958, the United
States Department of Justice filed a civil suit against two United States companies, General Electric Company and Westinghouse Electric Corporation
and against N. V. Philips from the Netherlands, all engaged in the manufacture of radio and television sets, charging a contravention of the United
States antitrust laws. The complaint alleged that the defendants, operating
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces .Tecum .Addressed to Canadian International Paper
Company et aL, 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
2 United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); see
also id., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
3 United States v. General Electric Company, 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949), modified
115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953).
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through Canadian subsidiaries, engaged with co-conspirators in an unlawful
conspiracy in restraint of foreign trade and commerce in radio and television
receiving sets, between the United States and Canada. Such restraint was
alleged to have been accomplished by the organization of a Canadian patent
pool (Canadian Patents Limited) controlled by the defendants' Canadian subsidiaries, which prevented the importation into Canada of radio and television receiving sets manufactured in the United States. Among other things,
the patent pool was alleged to have refused to license dealers who wished to
import United States made apparatus into Canada. The complaint alleged
that the Canadian market had been virtually closed to United States
manufacturers, and that United States consumers had been adversely affected, by being deprived of the benefits of the increased volume of such articles that would have been produced, had the patent pool not existed.
The suit caused concern in Canada as its object was to force Canadian
companies to make changes in their commercial practice, a matter which was
regarded as coming under Canadian laws rather than United States laws.
(The question of whether the imposition of private barriers to trade was in
Canada's interest, was never really addressed.) The situation gave rise to
discussions between the Attorney General of the United States and the
Minister of Justice of Canada and an informal agreement on consultative procedure between the two countries was reached-the Fulton-Rogers Understanding of 1959. The Honourable E. Davie Fulton described the discussion as
follows:
[I]t was readily agreed that in any similar situation in the future,
discussions will be held between the two governments at the appropriate stage when it becomes apparent that interests in one of our
countries are likely to be affected by the enforcement of the antitrust
laws of the other. Such discussions would be designed to explore ways
and means of avoiding the sort of situation which would give rise to
objections or misunderstandings in the other country. It was,
however, made clear that each government would have to reserve its
ultimate responsibility to decide for itself what action it should take,
and that such consultations should not be regarded in any way as
necessarily implying approval of the action ultimately taken.
I believe that the arrival at an understanding on prior consulta-

tion is a real accomplishment ....

4

The conclusion of that Understanding was followed by a long period during which there were very few difficulties of any consequence between Canada
and the United States on antitrust matters. A few potentially abrasive situations were quietly worked out in a mutually satisfactory way. To the extent
possible under the rules of confidentiality, each country notified the other at
the earliest possible stage and kept the other informed of significant
developments in the litigation. I might add, in case there is any doubt, that
4 See generally [1959] 1 HOUSE OF COMMONS DEB. 619 (Can.) (statement of Hon. E.D.
Fulton, the Minister of Justice).
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most of the advice about inquiries impacting on the other country came, of
course, from the United States where the antitrust administration has always
been much more active and had much stronger legislation than is the case in
Canada.
The fifteen years following the Fulton-Rogers Understanding saw what
can best be described as cautious (Corwin Edwards called it glacial) progess
in international cooperation in antitrust matters. The OECD Committee of
Experts on Restrictive Business Practices, which had come into being in the
early 1960's became increasingly active. It is not irrelevant to note that Mr.
Justice D.H.W. Henry, who was then the head of our Bureau, was Chairman
of that Committee for a long period. And Mr. Wilbur Fugate, then Chief of
the Foreign Section of the United States Antitrust Division chaired a working
party of the Committee whose concern was international cooperation on antitrust matters.
Much of the impetus for the work of the Committee came from the rapid
development of antitrust laws in Europe and Japan. One result of that work
was the OECD Recommendation of 1967 Respecting Consultation and
Notification. It provided for notification and consultation by member countries much along the lines of the Fulton-Rogers Understanding. In addition,
the Recommendation envisaged active cooperation among countries in the
control of restrictive business practices affecting international trade. These
latter parts of the Recommendation state:
That where two or more Member countries proceed against a restrictive business practice in international trade, they should endeavour to
co-ordinate their action in so far as appropriate and practicable
under national laws.
To supply each other with information on restrictive business practices in international trade whcih their laws and legitimate interests
permit them to disclose.
To co-operate in developing or applying mutually beneficial methods
of dealing with restrictive business practices in international trade. 5
I would not want to exaggerate the practical effects of that Recommendation. However, the many notifications which have been made under it,
combined with the other work of the Committee, have certainly contributed
to an international flow of information on antitrust matters.
In 1969, discussions were held between Canada and the United States to
reaffirm and extend the Fulton-Rogers Understanding and to relate it to the
1967 OECD Recommendation.
In November 1969, the Honourable Ron Basford, now of course Minister
of Justice, but at the time Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, and
the United States Attorney General, the Honourable John N. Mitchell, issued
a joint communiqud confirming and extending the Fulton-Rogers Understanding of 1959. It reads in part as follows:
5 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RECOMMENDATION
OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING CO-OPERATION BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES ON RESTRICrIVE
BUSINESS PRACTICES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1 (Oct. 5, 1967).
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In addition, therefore, to continuing the Notification and Consultation Procedure in accordance with the 1959 Understanding, the
two cabinet members agreed that the O.E.C.D. Recommendation of
1967 should be actively implemented as between Canada and the
United States in relation to restrictive business practices and international trade. Notification and consultation will continue under both
arrangements. Each country will, in so far as its national laws and
legitimate interests permit, provide the other with information in its
possession of activities or situations, affecting international trade,
that the other requires in order to consider whether there has been a
breach of its restrictive business practices laws.
A primary concern would be cartel and other restrictive
agreements and restrictive business practices of multinational corporations affecting international trade. The enforcement agencies of
the two countries, each within its own jurisdiction, will where possible
co-ordinate the enforcement6 of their respective laws against such
restrictive business practices.
About this time, new factors were developing which were destined to
have an impact upon the antitrust relations between Canada and the United
States. One was a substantial increase in the resources devoted by the United
States to enforcement in the international arena. Another was the increasing
involvement of government in industrial policies. A third factor was the growing concern in Canada about the high levels of foreign ownership in
Canadian industry, often reflecting the acquisition of Canadian enterprises
rather than new investment.
Many of you will recall the Gray Report on Foreign Direct Investment in
Canada which appeared in 1972. Aside from leading to the creation of the
Foreign Investment Review Agency, that report had an influence on the Stage
I amendments to the Combines Investigation Act, which came into force in
1976. It has also influenced the Stage II amendments, which I shall discuss in
a few moments.
By no means all the findings of the Gray Report were negative, but some
of them were, including the following:
-that a large percentage of forieng-controlled companies were
operating under export restrictions imposed by their parents;
-that certain United States laws, notably the Trading-with-theEnemy Act, restricted the freedom of foreign-owned firms in Canada
to compete in some foreign markets;
-that some Canadian industries under heavy foreign control had
become small-scale replicas of the United States industries. Faced
with a small market, they consisted largely of "truncated" rather than
integrated firms. The Report expressed concern that the United
States antitrust laws might conflict with a policy of restructuring of
such industries.
6 The Basford-Mitchell Understanding was announced and described in U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Joint Statement (press release, Nov. 3, 1969) (emphasis added) (copy on file at the offices
of the Canada-UnitedStates Law Journal).

1979]

EXTRATERRITORIAL

ANTITRUST CONFERENCE

171

There have, in addition, been several inquiries which have brought out
some of the difficulties faced by a country like Canada in dealing with restrictive practices by international enterprises. Some of you will recall the Report
of the Royal Commission on Farm Machinery in 1971. It documented the existence of a multiple price system on farm tractors operated by the world's
leading manufacturers which were mainly based in North America but which
had important production facilities in Europe and particularly in Britain.
Prices on sales in Europe were, and probably still are, substantially lower
than on sales in North America. The study identified certain restrictive practices in Britain which helped achieve that .result by preventing shipments
from low to high priced markets. Despite the fact that one of the firms,
Massey Ferguson, was Canadian based, there proved to be little that could be
done to protect Canadian farmers from the effects of this international price
discrimination.
Then there was our case against the Electric Reduction Company, Erco. 7
Erco, a wholly owned subsidiary of a British firm, Albright and Wilson, was
the only Canadian producer of red phosphorus. The parent firm was a
member of an international cartel. Erco was not a signatory to the agreement
which was styled the Hunting Ground Agreement, but it was de facto a part
of it because of the parent company's control over its foreign trade. However,
the fact that Erco was only indirectly involved made it unlikely that a prosecution on a conspiracy charge under the Combines Investigation Act would
succeed, even though the possibility of off-shore competition in Canada was
eliminated by the arrangement.
In 1971, while the Gray Report was being written, the Honourable Ron
Basford introduced Bill C-256, the Competition Act. The bill met a solid wall
of hostility from the legal profession and the business community. It is not
surprising that some of the concerns about foreign ownership found expression in that Bill, nor that some of its provisions were finally enacted in the
Stage I amendments to the Combines Investigation Act in 1975.
Sections 31.5 and 31.6 of the Act as amended in 1975 deal with the implementation in Canada of foreign judgments, laws and directives. The
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission is empowered, upon application by
the Director, to review and issue remedial orders respecting the implementation in Canada of foreign judgments, laws and directives which would have
specified adverse effects in Canada. The Act is not a general facility for
blocking foreign orders. To attract an order there must be a finding that implementation of the foreign judgment or order would: (a) adversely affect
competition in Canada; (b) adversely affect the efficiency of trade and industry in Canada; (c) adversely affect the foreign trade of Canada without
compensating advantages; or (d) would otherwise restrain or injure trade or
commerce in Canada without compensating advantages.
It bears emphasis that the foreign judgment or order must have an
adverse effect of the kinds specified in the Act. The section was not designed
Trade Practices in the Phosphorus Products and Sodium Chlorate Industries, Report of
the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Ottawa, 1966, RTPC No. 41.
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to provide a safeharbor in Canada for foreign owned firms who wish to
engage in anticompetitive practices which would be illegal in their countries
of origin.
It is of interest to note that the Gray Report expressed strong support for
similar sections which had originally been proposed in Bill C-256. However,
the Report also recommended that the Combines Act be amended so as clearly to cover compliance with foreign subpoenas or other orders to produce
documents, as well as voluntary compliance by foreign owned firms to foreign
requests for documents. That recommendation has not been implemented.
The amendments of 1975 also contain two other provisions which I
should mention. They are intended to deal with cases such as Erco where a
firm in Canada is involved by foreign directive in the implementation of collusive arrangements entered into outside Canada which, if entered into within
Canada, would be contrary to section 32. There is a civil procedure to deal
with that in section 31.6 and a criminal provision in section 32.1. Both may
not be applied to the same case. It is proposed in the Stage II amendments to
clarify and strengthen these sections.
The Stage II amendments as contained in Bill C-42 propose no changes
in the existing provisions respecting the implementation in Canada of foreign
judgments or laws. They do, however, extend significantly the law's defences
against private restrictive business practices emanating from abroad. They
also include provisions to facilitate international cooperation in the control of
restrictive business practices.
A new section 31.61 relates especially to the multinational enterprise.
The section provides that the Competition Policy Advocate may apply to the
Competititon Board for a remedial order, where a corporation carrying on
business in Canada has agreed with or received instructions from an affiliate
abroad, to substantially restrict imports or exports. The Board must find that
the restriction is designed to protect the price level in a Canadian market
from import competition or to protect the price level in a foreign market
from Canadian competition. The Board may not issue an order unless it is
satisfied that the corporation accounts for at least twenty-five percent of
Canadian production or supply.
This section is responsive to one of the most serious concerns expressed in
the Gray Report, that of international trade restrictions placed upon foreign
controlled firmi in Canada. It has been carefully drafted so as not to interfere with normal and legitimate management decisions. It does not, for example, affect the international rationalization of productive facilities by a
multinational. The section would apply to a major firm in an industry which
consistently, on orders from a foreign affiliate, conforms to an international
market allocation scheme designed to protect different price levels in different
countries with results adverse to Canada.
Another provision of interest in the State II revisions is a new section
numbered 32.1, which deals with participation of Canadian firms in international cartels rather than with the relationships among affiliates of a multinational firm which I have just discussed. At the present time, the only prohibi-
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tion which could be applied to an international cartel is section 32 relating to
collusive arrangements. While there is a lack of jurisprudence on the matter,
it appears that the requirement of undueness in that section may create difficulties. The proposed section 32.1 has no requirement of undueness. It
would be an offence for one or more persons in Canada to agree with one or
more persons abroad to restrict exports or imports of a product or otherwise
adversely affect competition in Canada. It would be a defence to such a
charge if the court were satisfied that the accused did not account for fifty
percent or more of Canadian production or supply. The section will not apply to agreements authorized by Parliament.
Finally, Bill C-42 places some emphasis upon international cooperation in
the control of restrictive business practices. In the first place, although the
Bill continues and slightly strengthens the existing exemption for export
agreements in section 32, it provides for removal of that exemption where an
export agreement "is contrary to any agreement into which Canada has
entered with any other country relating to private restrictions on international
trade." For example, if the United States agreed with Canada that it would
provide no exemptions for Webb-Pomerene arrangements when the Canadian
market was affected, it would be open to Canada to make a reciprocal agreement that export exemption under Canadian law would be lost if the arrangement played against the United States market.
Moreover, a new section 47.1 makes specific provision for Canada to
enter into international agreements on antitrust matters. The section provides
in part:
The Minister may, with the approval of the Governor in Council,
enter into agreements with the governments of other countries providing for the elimination of private restrictions on international
trade, asistance in the administration and enforcement of laws
relating to the safeguarding of competition or the exchange of information relevant to the administration and enforcement of such laws,
and the Competition Policy Advocate may supply and receive information in accordance with any such agreement notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act.
Perhaps you will now understand more clearly my opening remark that I
was not entirely happy with the title of my topic. It is at best an oversimplification to describe the Stage I and Stage II amendments as Canada's
response to the overseas reach of United States antitrust law. It is true that
sections 31.5 and 31.6 relating to foreign judgments, laws and directives would
apply where a United States antitrust proceeding had the specified adverse effects on Canada. Fortunately, however, not many such proceedings have
those adverse effects upon Canada. There is a much higher probability that
the sections could have been applied successfully, to past manifestations of
the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act.
Most of the Stage I and Stage II amendments I have described are
Canada's response in a different sense. They are Canada's response to concerns, some of which are shared by our American friends, about international
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restrictive business practices. True, our concerns and our reponses are coloured by the particular features of our economy. As predominantly a host
country to multinationals, we are more prone than are the Americans, to
identify certain internal practices of multinations as restrictive. And, possibly
because we do not have the same strength to enforce our laws abroad, we
confine ourselves to proceedings and remedies which can be applied in our
own territory.
I suggested earlier that one of the developments not fully taken into account by Fulton-Rogers and Basford-Mitchell was the growing involvement of
governments in industrial policies. The three most recent United States antitrust proceedings which created difficulties were all complicated by that factor. The potash case involved the Government of Saskatchewan and the
uranium case involved Ottawa. The Rolls-Royce-Pratt and Whitney case also
involved federal policies.
Some of the Stage II amendments increase the likelihood of conflicts arising in the application of Canadian and American competition laws. I am
thinking particularly of the provisions respecting mergers and specialization
agreements. Both provisions contain what can best be described as an efficiency override. A merger or a specialization agreement which offers important gains in efficiency will be approved even where competition is substantially lessened. These provisions were inserted to take account of problems
associated with Canada's relatively small domestic market. The United States
has no similar problems and no similar provisions in its antitrust laws.
Moreover, the proposed Competition Board would be empowered to prohibit or to place its stamp of approval on mergers and specialization
agreements which were challenged before it, and not to mandate them. Also,
in the case of specialization agreements, applications for approval will be
made by the parties rather than by the Competition Policy Advocate, so you
can see what problems are likely to arise given what Donald Baker has said
about the sovereign immunity issue.
An American owned subsidiary in Canada might well hesitate to participate in an application for approval of a specialization agreement for fear
of violating United States law, and this could frustrate Canadian policies
enunciated in law. It is reasonably clear from United States jurisprudence
that American law would not extend to a subsidiary where its action was
compelled by a law of the country in which it was established, but even that
statement has to bear some nuances as Donald Baker has pointed out. The
subsidiary's position is at best unclear, however, if it is involved in a merger
or specialization agreement which has been approved by the Competition
Board but which is of a kind which normally would be in violation of United
States law.
The potash and uranium cases, which I do not intend to discuss today,
also brought to public attention problems created by the collection of
documentary and other evidence in Canada by United States antitrust
authorities. As these cases have illustrated, Canadian authorities may not
always believe it to be in the Canadian interest for evidence to be transferred
abroad.
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Fortunately for me, it is beyond my terms of reference this morning to
offer solutions to these recent problems or to forecast what Canada's responses
will be. Judging from the past record, I would expect an important element
of the solution to emerge from amicable discussions between our two countries and a growing awareness of each other's problems.

